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What Happened To Aesthetics?
Paul Redding
Three recent books-Gordon Graham. Philosophy of The Am: An
Introduction to Aesthetics; Wolfgang Welsch. Undoing Aesthetics; Eliot
Deutsch. Essays on the Nature of Art---Dffer a sampling of what
philosophers have to say about art and the aesthetic realm at the end
of a century that has not been particularly kind to philosophical
aesthetics. l Perhaps it is just that the nineteenth century was such a
hard act to follow in this regard. For example. after an aborted
professional career. Arthur Schopenhauer. with his sombre but heady
mix ofaesthetics and speculative metaphysics. eventually became one
of the most widely read philosophers ever. More spectacularly still.
in the last decade of the century his erstwhile follower Friedrich
Nietzsche had scrambled over him. changing his pessimism into an
aesthetic affirmation of life. and achieved cult status. But with the new
century. aesthetics as a big ticket item seemed to suffer the same fate
as many other aspects of nineteenth-century life-the art. music.
literature. architecture. and. not least. the religiosity. characteristic
of it.
In this century it has more generally been writers at the edge of or
outside the parameters of conventional aesthetics that have received a
significant readership. A variety of movements have competed with
the older aesthetic framework to capture the imagination of those who
reflect upon the reception of art works. Many have had the modem
look of that quasi-scientific formal orientation towards literary texts
seen in Russian and Czech poetics in the early century and in
movements like structuralism and semiotics in the nineteen sixties and
seventies. More recently. such formal analyses have been often blended
in a 'post-structuralist' manner with orientations to cultural creations
viewed in terms of their relations to existing social institutions. such
that the various moral and political critiques of the latter (marxist.
post-marxist. feminist. and so on) have been extended to the former.
Thus these rivals to aesthetics have not simply competed with it but
have challenged the legitimacy of aesthetic value itself. As one
commentator on the current situation within academic literary studies
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has noted: 'The reaction to "the aesthetic" has been so strong and
persuasively articulated that it may now seem nearly impossible to
pilot ourselves between the Scylla of intrinsic literary analysis and the
Charybdis of extrinsic cultural critique, between a concern for the
peculiarly literary qualities of language and the radical democratizing
of all language as ecriture, between our substantial love for poetry for
its own sake and our deep suspicion that all such loves are poisoned by
the ideological masters they secretly serve'.2
It is this situation that is commonly portrayed in the popular press
as one ofon-going culture wars in which post-'sixties 'tenured radicals',
with heads filled with 'continental philosophy', continue their assault
on established institutions and values. But such racy journalistic
accounts invariably fail to capture the historical depth of the
disturbances within humanistic culture in general, and the aesthetic
realm in particular. One could go back to the challenges posed to the
classical aesthetic tradition by the massive dislocations and
discontinuities within the various art forms early this century. It was
the new sensibility, characteristically thought of as 'modernist', with
its various complicated relations to the broader changes to 'modem'
life, that had already left the nineteenth-century aesthetic tradition
looking distinctly fusty. To some extent those first-order appreciative
discourses constituting criticism in the particular arts could adapt to
the new sensibility by becoming formal, but, as indicated above, by
the 'sixties and 'seventies this type of formalism had been annexed to
various types of political and ideological critique. Moreover, in the
last decades of the century this early modernist sensibility, together
with its critical articulation, has itself been on the defensive against
'post-modem' challenges to assumptions on which it relied-the firm
opposition of serious art to popular culture, for example. It is little
wonder that the more general type of reflection on the arts that we
typically think of as philosophical aesthetics has been struggling to
keep up. In order to avoid the arrogant emptiness of a type of external
legislation on aesthetic matters, philosophical aestheticians have had
to rely on these more concrete first-order appreciative discourses of
the critics, but there they have been able to find less and less that is
identifiably 'aesthetic'.
The three books here exemplify different approaches to aesthetics
and even different views of the role of aesthetics within philosophy.
Given the very different intentions behind each of them-<>ne, for
example, is meant as an introductory textbook-{;omparisons may be
unfair; and yet, unfair or not, such comparisons can still be illuminating.
170
Symposium I: Paul Redding
And in certain superficial respects these books are comparable: while
Graham's book is explicitly presented as an introductory textbook in
philosophical aesthetics. those of Welsch and Eliot might be thought
ofas directed to much the same target audience-a readership relatively
new to aesthetics and philosophy, and interested in finding some
language within which to reflect upon the role that art and other
aesthetic phenomena play in their lives. Furthermore. all three books
have a similar format. beginning with three or four more general,
theoretical chapters. which are then followed by a number of chapters
in which the ideas sketched earlier are applied to concrete cases
involving differing art forms. or more broadly. different types of
cultural creation. But within these superficial commonalties it is the
differences that are interesting-<1ifferences that might. on first pass
and in a crude way, be correlated with the geographical locations of
their authors.
Wolfgang Welsch is Professor ofPhilosophy at the Friedrich Schiller
University at lena, a location that could be thought of as the birth-
place of classical aesthetics. As a work of a philosopher in a major
continental European university, Undoing Aesthetics may not be
entirely typical of the genre of 'continental philosophy' but, at least in
its contrast to one of the other books, it can serve as. representative.
Essentially an assemblage of thematically overlapping essays and
occasional lectures, Welsch's book presents sketches of a broad
theoretical viewpoint that he has developed in more detail elsewhere,3
a viewpoint signalled in the title of the book, and perhaps even more
accurately in the title of its fourth chapter, 'Aesthetics Beyond
Aesthetics'. With titles like these, one is not going to expect this work
to be any narrowly 'aesthetic' one confined to a philosophical reflection
on beauty and the arts. Its contrasting 'other' in this and further
respects is Philosophy of The Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics by
Gordon Graham. Profcssor of Moral Philosophy at the University of
Aberdeen. In general its approach is fairly representative of 'analytic
philosophy', albeit a rather older style than is practised in many parts
of the analytic world. The geographical location of Eliot Dcutsch, the
author of the third work, Essays on the Nature of Art, also seems
significant. Deutsch is Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Hawaii, a location neatly emblematic of his willingness to venture
beyond the boundaries of Europe and to talk of art works from Asian
traditions as well. But further. his geographical location reflects
something of his relative philosophical distance from centres of
traditional continental European and Anglophone culture, seen here in
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his capacity to use and to choose between the different traditions to
suit his own purposes.
That western philosophical culture is now divided between two
different ways ofdoing philosophy, the 'analytic' and the 'continental',
is a commonplace. and, like all dichotomising stereotypes, this can be
as distorting as it is illuminating. Thus, while the adjective 'analytic'
at least says something about typically Anglophone ways of doing
philosophy, 'continental' tells one nothing other than conveying the
somewhat misleading idea that it is philosophy as practised in
'continental Europe'-misleading, because it is not particularly usual
for the continental European counterparts of American or English
philosophy departments to pursue philosophy in this way. (One might
even suggest that the category of 'continental philosophy' is itself an
Anglophone rather than 'continental' one, characterising more a
particular style of cultural reflection and analysis found within some
philosophy departments and more widely within other humanities
departments within the English-speaking world.) But while it is easy
to ignore the overlaps. parallels and convergences, it is true that there
are characteristic differences between these approaches. Indeed, these
differences are particularly clear in their respective attitudes to the
aesthetic realm.
From about the late 1960s on, frustrated by what they took to be the
narrow limitations of the analytic style, and driven by the desire to
make philosophy relevant beyond the walls of the academy, some
analytic philosophers and their students 'went continental'. In doing
this they were often reacting to certain perceived characteristics of the
analytic philosophy that had become the institutionally dominant form
ofphilosophy within English-speaking philosophy departments. These
features-a rather strict demarcation from both other humanistic and
scientific disciplines. a narrowing of focus to often technical journal-
article-sized problems, a method centring in close analyses of logic
and language. and a complementary uncoupling from the traditional
'big' philosophical problems of the past-were regarded by the rebels
as depriving philosophy of that breadth of application which alone
justified its name. With this, these philosophers were part of a larger
movement within many humanities and social science departments
which looked to the work of various continental European thinkers-
to French, German, dissident eastern European, and Italian thinkers,
as well as to philosophers, literary theorists, social theorists, psycho-
analysts and so on-to provide their own work with some broader
framework. That is, disaffected with what academic philosophy had to
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offer at home, they went to continental Europe on a type of theoretical
shopping spree, and 'continental philosophy' was what they brought
home.
It could be argued that, within philosophy itself, while the
'continentals' typically saw themselves on the side of progress and as
against a rigidified status quo, it was the analytic movement that was
in fact the most typically 'modern' version of philosophy around, and
that it was the comparative lack of its modernising characteristics that
attracted the rebels to a philosophical culture existing as much outside
the walls of universities in France. Germany et cetera, as within them.
We might see this, for example, in the typical demand that philosophy
be 'relevant' to everyday life, for what looks like 'irrelevance to
everyday life' is often a reflection of just those characteristic features
of 'modernisation' within cultural spheres (their institutionalisation,
professionalisation, and autonomisation, the role of specialisation
within them, and so on) to which diagnosticians of 'the modem' have
pointed. In the twentieth century. English-speaking academic
philosophy had become institutionalised as adistinct discipline standing
alongside other humanistic disciplines and various natural and social
sciences. Like other cultural domains attempting to justify a separate
institutional existence, academic philosophy had to face the question
of what was distinct ahout what it did. What was eventually to become
'analytic philosophy' had done this by an appeal to a method that
owed much to the crucial developments in mathematical logic around
the turn of the century. By narrowing the types ofquestions philosophy
asked and tried to answer, and by invoking various techniques for
separating well- from ill-formed questions and so on, analytic
philosophers thought of philosophy as now, finally. able to progress.
Its critics saw this same process more as reflecting a degeneration of a
tradition into narrowness and irrelevancy.
The picture I have sketched is, of course, little more than caricature
but. if there is any truth in it at all, then it will be clear why continental
philosophy has never been a unified movement. And so, in order to
have some loosely coherent self-image. continental philosophy. like
many other 'traditions', had to retrospectively reconstruct itself. Here,
one factor that has been commonly seen as linking its diverse parts has
been the sense of a historical relation to the late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century philosophical tradition of 'German idealism'-the
tradition running from Kant through Fichte to Schelling and Hegel.
And without too much distonion, it might be said that from these latter
two thinkers can be reconstructed two different strands winding their
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way into the present. strands which have always stood in what has at
best been an awkward relation. On the one side. from Hegel has
stemmed the more rationalist political and 'critical' side in which a
reflective move is typically made from forms of thought to their broad
social and cultural conditions. usually with an eye to the identification
of their disruptive tensions and 'contradictions'. On the other, from
Schelling has evolved a more aestheticist and irrationalist or arationalist
dimension, more suspicious of conceptual thought. on the one hand,
and modernity, on the other. It is this laner strand that runs through
thinkers like Schopcnhauer and Nietzsche. and in this century,
Heidegger and Derrida. and it was this strand which produced the high
points of nineteenth-century aesthetics-an aesthetics never far from
a type of aestheticised metaphysical picture of the world. most explicit
in Schelling and Schopenhauer. In different ways, both identified a
type of 'first philosophy' with aesthetics, and regarded art works as
the locus of aspecial and deep kind of 'truth', unable to be captured by
the conceptual languages of science.
As suggested. these two strands of the post-Kantian tradition have
wound themselves into current continental thought in complicated and
unstable ways. More recent inheritors of the aestheticist side of the
tradition. such as Derrida for example. have tended to reject such
metaphysical appeals to deeper philosophical truths manifested in art
works or anywhere else. Nevenheless. works of art and literature still
generally occupy so central and significant aplace within the continental
tradition as a whole that any equivalent seems unimaginable for the
more science-centred analytic philosophy. It is hard to imagine. for
example. anyone influenced by the post-idealist tradition as ever
uttering anything like the opening sentences of Graham's book: 'The
arts'. he informs the reader. 'are an imponant part of human life and
culture. They attract a large measure of attention and support.' (p.l)
For Schelling. Nietzsche or Heidegger. art works are not imponant
parts of human life: rather. they have so central a role in those
processes giving form to human life and making each of us who we
are that they might be thought as constitutive of human life itself.
Thus. for Nietzsche. for example. human lives are rightly viewed as
art works. rather than as natural kinds. and the only 'ultimate' purpose
there could be in life is that of creating oneself into a strong and
exceptional piece of art. It is obvious that from this perspective there is
going to be much more drama in aesthetic thought than could ever be
generated within the analytic tradition. This type of difference
concerning the nature of the aesthetic hits one between the eyes when
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one puts down Welsch's book and picks up Graham's.
As is readily apparent when one reads Graham's textbook, aesthetics
has never been a growth area within mainstream analytic philosophy.
One would only have to place this book besides an equivalent
introductory text to, say, the philosophy of mind or philosophy of
language, to be struck by the modesty of typically analytic contributions
to aesthetics. Significantly, the particular work within Anglophone
aesthetics which gets most attention here is R. G. Collingwood's The
Principles of Art, a work which is over sixty years old by an author
who had little to do with the analytic movement. The only significant
bodies of analytic work of a general kind touched on are mainly from
the 1960s and '70s dealing with issues such as the meaning of
'expression' in the context of expressivist theories of art. This is not to
say that there have been no contemporary and significant works on art
by 'analytic' philosophers-Arthur Danto, Stanley Cavell. and Richard
Wollheim. for example. come immediately to mind-but usually
these works are far from exemplary of the analytic approach. In this
regard it seems significant that Cavell and Wollheim only scrape in
with bare mentions in Graham's introduction under 'suggestions for
further reading', and Danto doesn't achieve even this: in some respects.
it is difficult to see how they could fit the image of philosophy as
exemplified in Graham's approach.
As might be expected from the tone of Graham's opening lines, his
analyses never stray far from reflections upon views on art that might
be attributed to the fabled rider on the Clapham bus. While
Schopenhauer could send the mind spinning with his discussion of art
works against the background of a striking and quasi-religious image
of an individual's attempts to transcend the process of the world
conceived 'as will'. Graham's approach is to appeal to the likely
views of the late twentieth-century reader on the nature of the value of
art works: Are they there to gi ve us pleasure? Do they express emotions?
Do we learn anything from them?
It is not that Graham never introduces the bigger aesthetic theories
of the past, or even those of contemporary continental philosophers-
he does, and he even concludes his book with a favourahle look to
Hegel and Schopenhauer as representatives of the type of normative
approach to aesthetics he wants to espouse. The point is, rather. that
these types of approaches can only really be presented within the
contexts ofreflections upon these sorts ofeveryday questions mentioned
above. Thus, we find hoth Kant and Hans-Georg Gadamer briefly
dealt with in the context of a discussion of hedonistic analyses of
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aesthetic value. That Gadamer's approach belongs to a very different
order is acknowledged when Graham quotes Gadamer's 'compelling'
(and Schopenhauerian) view that it is perhaps only through art that 'it
... is granted to us finite beings to relate to what we caJl eternity'. But
to this the author adds a caution about 'a certain vagueness' in
Gadamer's view, 'for we have not been told what the nature of this
fonn of 'relating' is ... this is a crucial omission' (p.I?).
Each time Graham touches on such ideas, a note as to their
vagueness, difficulty or obscurity is predictably forthcoming. It is not
that these comments are wholly unjustified: by the standards of analytic
philosophy, the writing of continental philosophers is typically
unclear. But this reveals as much about the expectations of what type
of clarity philosophy can achieve with respect to aesthetic phenomena
as it does about the attraction of continentals to obscurity. Analysis
emerged at the start of the century from revolutionary developments
in mathematical logic, and, while by no means as centred on logical
analysis as it once was, it seems fair to say that this early focus
encouraged a style of philosophising that has persisted. and that that
style has not been easily extended to all other domains. least of all
aesthetics. The difficulty facing analytic aesthetics might be best
exemplified by invoking an issue not in aesthetics but rather at the
centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind-the issue of
'phenomenal consciousness'. Analytic thought about the mind seems
to have taken decades to get around to acknowledging (and many still
refuse to do so) that there is something about the nature ofconsciousness
that the uninitiated might regard as obvious-that there is always
something 'that it is like' to be conscious, or that there are certain
characteristic 'feels' to it. Habituated to particular ways of talking
about the mind (talking in tenns of the having of 'attitudes'. such as
belief. to 'propositional contents', for example), analytic philosophers
simply do not seem to have the resources for talking about this issue of
'subjectivity' and, if this is the case, one might expect that they are not
going to have much in the way of resources for engaging with the sorts
of experiences most people think to be what art and literature are all
about. So. while analytic writers. against the demands of a style forged
in reflections on such experience-distant issues as the reducihility of
mathematics to logic, might see the style of their continental colleagues
as unnecessarily baroque, these colleagues arc just as likely to be
incredulous at the idea that anything interesting about aesthetic life is
ever going to be caught in the analysts' methodological nets.
In contrast to Graham's background and approach. Welsch's work
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assumes these interlacing aesthetic and critical strands as pretty well
constitutive of modem philosophy, and for this reason many analytic
readers will be nonplussed. or more likely outraged. at many of his
seemingly extravagant claims. For example, in place of Graham's
sober utterances about the importance of the ans in life, Welsch says
things like: 'Reality has proven itself again and again to be constituted
not "realistically" but "aesthetically".' (p.ix) Like Schiller or Schelling.
Welsch treats aesthetics as the central discipline of philosophy, and
not just as an academic activity, but as a type of general orientation to
life. But. being an 'aesthetics beyond aesthetics'. his aesthetics is far
from reducible to such classical approaches. For him aesthetics is
central to thought not because it reveals some higher reality. but
because it reflects the ubiquity and depth within modem life and
thought of the process of 'aestheticisation'. But if this aestheticisation
of the world can be thought as a triumph of the classical aestheticist
program. Welsch is certainly not celebrating it. We live in a world in
which the Schillerian dream looks more like a waking nightmare. a
world in which beautification. embellishment and stylisation can be
overbearing to the extent of forcing a retreat into the anaesthetic as a
survival mechanism. Moreover stylisation is not restricted to the
traditional realm of aesthetic-art works. or even to the surface look
of things: it goes all the way down. Welsch treats even the deep
processes of our interactions with nature as aesthetic: even 'genetic
engineering is a kind of genetic cosmetic surgery' (p.82). Furthermore,
aestheticisation is a process of 'derealisation'. turning the solid into
surface. In a diagnosis that recalls the speculations advanced by a
number ofcommentators upon the recent grisly phenomenon ofstudent
shooting sprees in the US, Welsch observes a form of life which is
lived as if within a computer game.
I have mentioned that Welsch is not a typical representative of
'continental philosophy'. This is. perhaps. because. being in fact a
continental philosopher. his interests and references are not trapped
inside this as a genre. But the atypicality that I refer to resides more in
his attempt to hold onto the aesthetic at the same time as critically
reflecting on it; more common is that more reductionist dimension to
critique that one finds in Pierre Bourdieu. for example. But if Welsch
doesn't fit easily into the 'critique' side of the tradition. neither does
he easily fit into the Schellingian wing. For one thing. his rather
breezy and readable style contrasts with many of those who, in the
face of the collapse of aesthetic metaphysics. have turned to a type of
aesthetic analogue of negative theology. Many readers will inevitably
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respond at some stage to Welsch's big claims with scepticism, will
find fault with his readings of Kant and others, with his controversial
analyses of modem science and technology and so on. But regardless
ofone's particular criticisms, it is still possible to be left with the sense
that Welsch is forging interesting ways of making apparent something
that is important and disturbing about the direction in which our
culture is heading.
Martin Heidegger commenced a famous set oflectures on aesthetics
with the observation that we put art works in museums precisely when
they cease being real presences in our lives. Following Schelling he
thought of art paradigmatically as the way in which 'the gods' are
introduced into the lives of the members of a community, gods who
were concrete instantiations of the values by which such people
directed their lives. That art was now confined to the museum reflected
something about the fact that the gods have now departed from our
world.
Welsch's aesthetic critique of aestheticisation shares some aspects
of Heidegger's critique of modernity, but it was Heidegger's idea that
came to mind when I turned to the list of art works that Gordon
Graham has appended to his textbook. These are art works used as
examples in the book and 'readers are recommended to take steps to
familiarise themselves with a good number' of them. (p.178) Just
about everything on the list is, predictably, a type of 'museum piece',
and I suspect that of those undergraduates at whom the book is aimed
many would need to take many steps indeed in order to make the
merest dint in this formidable list. (My quick count of the novels alone
came to twenty two.) One might guess that the only examples with
which many potential readers would be familiar occur under the
heading 'Film and television' which mixes Battleship Potemkin,
Breathless and Citizen Kane with Melrose Place, Neighbours. and
Nightmare on Elm Street. But if these last three examples look like
some spiritless concession to the postrnodern. this view is corrected
when one goes hack to the contexts in which Melrose Place et al. are
invoked-they essentially stand in for Bentham's example of 'pushpin'
in a reflection on the utilitarian approach to aesthetic pleasure. That is,
the only aesthetic examples with which many will not have to 'take
steps to familiarise themselves' are examples of what aesthetic value
is not. It seems striking that for analytic aesthetics such a fact is not
itself a problem for philosophical aesthetic thought.
I earlier described Eliot Deutsch's Essays on the Nature ofArt as
combining elements of both analytic and continental traditions. but in
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this postmodem age it would be unwise to expect or even wish for any
reconciling synthesis here. Deutsch's book starts like Graham's with
chapters devoted to common sorts of answers to questions about the
nature of art-art as imitation, art as expression, and so on. Although
short, these chapters are, again like Graham's. informative surveys,
although Deutsch goes on to use the ideas sketched here to reach a
type of synthetic definition of art for his own application. Following
on from these, again like Graham. he has chapters devoted to specific
art fonns within which he applies the ideas clarified in the earlier ones.
Not being restricted to the fonnat of an introductory text. Deutsch's
can presuppose a greater degree of sophistication on the part of the
reader. but it is nevertheless clearly written and accessible and could
be easily used in an introductory course. As mentioned earlier. one of
the more attractive aspects of Deutsch's book is his use of examples
from Asian as well as European art. which give it an added sense of
freshness. And in comparison to Graham. Deutsch is also much more
willing to calIon ideas from the continental tradition, especially
Heidegger. whose ideas on the nature of the artistic 'disclosure' of
truth are sketched evocatively and economically. As Deutsch points
out, 'Heidegger. perhaps more than any other modern philosopher,
tried to formulate a conception of truth that does not assume the
primacy ofpropositional truth as such and to integrate that conception
into an understanding of art' (p.72). In contrast, it is striking that
Heidegger does not even receive a mention in Graham's book, despite
a chapter devoted to 'Art and Understanding'. Deutsch deftly shows
that it is possible to talk intelligibly about Heidegger and Nelson
Goodman on the one page.
1llis comparison which puts Graham in a negative light is still to
some degree unfair. however, because there is a price to be extracted
for Deutsch's rather easy oecumenicity. I quoted earlier Graham's
concern over 'a certain vagueness' in Gadamer's invoking ofa relation
to 'what we call eternity' without telling us what this relating is.
Indeed. much of Deutsch's ability to evoke the experience of the art
works he discusses seems to trade upon a definite vagueness over the
use of a type of language that many philosophers will refuse, the
language of 'the spiritual'. Of course it may be that there is an
undeniable historical link between art and religion, but endorsing this
link as somehow essential is an option that is not going to be available
to all those who wish to give some systematic account of the role of
aesthetic value in their lives.
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